Dems, Then & Now: Stand on a beach and deny the existence of sand

[Vitas]

October 07, 2004, 10:05 a.m.

By Deroy Murdock

Dems, Then & Now

Iraq terror-tie facts changed with the campaign season for Kerry and co.

To hear Iraq-war critics claim that Saddam Hussein lacked terror ties is to stand on a beach and listen to people deny the existence of sand. Now, comes John Kerry, strolling in his flip-flops, chanting the no-such-thing-as-sand mantra.

"Iraq was not a terrorist haven before the invasion," Kerry told Philadelphia voters September 24. "Iraq is now what it was not before the war: a haven for terrorists."

"The president just talked about Iraq as a center of the war on terror," Kerry said during the September 30 presidential debate. "Iraq was not even close to the center of the war on terror before the president invaded it."

Kerry's current position contradicts at least 15 key Democrats, Democratic-led federal agencies, and Establishment-Left media organizations that — at least until this election year — believed the inescapable truth: Saddam Hussein did have ties to terrorists, including al Qaeda.

If Kerry wishes to correct his recent, erroneous remarks, he should study the words of a Massachusetts senator named...John Kerry.

Kerry discussed "terrorist organizations" at an August 1, 1996, Senate Intelligence Committee hearing. He said, "These entities survive with country support, the support of the country of Syria, or country of Libya, or country of Iran, Iraq, and so forth."

"Saddam Hussein has already used these weapons [of mass death] and has made it clear that he has the intent to continue to try, by virtue of his duplicity and secrecy, to continue to do so," Kerry told reporters on February 23, 1998. "That is a threat to the stability of the Middle East. It is a threat with respect to the potential of terrorist activities on a global basis."

"The important thing is that Saddam Hussein and the world knows that we think Saddam Hussein is essentially out of synch with the times." Kerry said December 11, 2001 On Fox News's O'Reilly Factor. "He is and has acted like a terrorist, and he has engaged in activities that are unacceptable."

"I still don't see the hammer that's going to convince him to open anything up," O'Reilly replied.

Kerry continued: "The hammer, ultimately, will be the evidence that we uncover as we go further down the trail that shows his support for terrorism and begins to build the coalition even more strongly."

"What are your thoughts on going on further than Afghanistan, all terrorist places?" Larry King asked Kerry. The senator replied: "I think we clearly have to keep the pressure on terrorism globally. This doesn't end with Afghanistan by any imagination," he said December 14, 2001 on CNN. "Terrorism is a global menace. It's a scourge. And it is absolutely vital that we continue, for instance, Saddam Hussein."

Just before authorizing the Iraq war on October 9, 2002, Kerry referred to Saddam Hussein on the Senate floor: "He has supported and harbored terrorist groups, particularly radical Palestinian groups such as Abu Nidal, and he has given money to families of suicide murderers in Israel."

If the new John Kerry finds the old John Kerry's words unpersuasive, the former should consult Stephen Hayes's indispensable best seller, The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America, a guided tour of the terrorism factory that was Baathist Iraq. Among overwhelming evidence of Saddam Hussein's terrorist activities, Kerry will find numerous statements by liberal journalists, leading Democrats, and even a Clinton-appointed federal judge tying Saddam Hussein to Islamist terror.

During the fall 1992 campaign, Democratic vice-presidential nominee Al Gore chided Poppa Bush's administration for treading too lightly on Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi dictator, Gore said, "had already launched poison-gas attacks repeatedly, and Bush looked the other way. He had already conducted extensive terrorism activities, and Bush had looked the other way."

President Clinton addressed the nation on June 24, 1993. He said: "[T]here is compelling evidence that there was, in fact, a plot to assassinate former President Bush; and that this plot, which included the use of a powerful bomb made in Iraq, was directed and pursued by the Iraqi Intelligence Service." Clinton then lobbed 23 Tomahawk Cruise Missiles on IIS headquarters. "Therefore, we directed our action against the facility associated with Iraq's support of terrorism, while making every effort to minimize the loss of innocent life." The Kuwaiti trial of two Iraqi civilians, Wali al Ghazali and Raad Assadi, revealed that the IIS recruited them to position a Toyota Land Cruiser packed with 200 pounds of explosives near Poppa Bush during his April 1993 visit to Kuwait. Had that failed, the IIS also supplied a bomb-laced "suicide belt."

The late Les Aspin, Clinton's first Defense secretary, said of this plot: "The evidence is very conclusive that it was the work of the Iraqi Intelligence Service and is an action that would have had to have been approved by the highest levels of the Iraqi government."

Then-U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Madeleine Albright, showed the Security Council photos of the captured bombs. She said, "Certain aspects of these devices have been found only in devices linked to Iraq and not in devices used by any other terrorist groups."

In the spring of 1998, Clinton's Justice Department indicted Osama bin Laden for al Qaeda's attacks on U.S. interests. As the indictment read, "Al Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq."

As bin Laden's relationship with the Taliban showed some strains, the Washington Post published an Associated Press story on Valentine's Day 1999. It concluded: "The Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has offered asylum to bin Laden, who openly supports Iraq against Western powers."

In April 2000, President Clinton's State Department issued the 1999 edition of "Patterns of Global Terrorism," a biennial overview. As it had since 1993, Team Clinton's inaugural year, State designated Iraq a state sponsor of terrorism. "Iraq continued to plan and sponsor international terrorism in 1999," the report concluded. Baghdad "continued to provide safe haven and support to various terrorist groups."

On June 2, 2002, CBS's 60 Minutes aired Lesley Stahl's interview with Abdul Rahman Yasin, the al Qaeda murderer who the Justice Department indicted for preparing the bomb that exploded beneath One World Trade Center in February 1993.

"The majority of the people who work in the World Trade Center are Jews," Yasin said, explaining why he and his comrades targeted the WTC. Stahl interviewed Yasin in Baghdad where he fled after the blast, which killed six individuals and wounded 1,042. Before presenting him to Stahl, Iraqi authorities claimed they jailed Yasin for the bombing.

However, according to Sheila MacVicar of ABC's defunct Day One program, Yasin was a free man. "Last week, Day One confirmed he [Yasin] is in Baghdad," MacVicar reported June 27, 1994. "Just a few days ago, he was seen at [his father's] house by ABC News. Neighbors told us Yasin comes and goes frequently." Iraqi intelligence documents discovered since Baghdad's liberation indicate that Yasin received government-funded housing and a monthly salary.

Importantly, papers like these, and the post-liberation arrests of terrorists in Iraq — such as the now-deceased Palestinian extremist Abu Abbas — have implicated Saddam Hussein even further since his defeat.

New York Democrat Hillary Rodham Clinton declared on the Senate floor October 10, 2002, that Saddam Hussein gave "aid, comfort and sanctuary to terrorists, including al-Qaeda members."

That same day, North Carolina Democrat John Edwards — who crowed in Tuesday's vice-presidential debate that Hussein's ties to al Qaeda were "tenuous, at best" — told the Senate, "Almost no one disagrees with these basic facts: that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a menace; that he has weapons of mass destruction and that he is doing everything in his power to get nuclear weapons; that he has supported terrorists..."

The next day, Clinton and Edwards voted to authorize the Iraq war, as did John Kerry, back when he was for it, before he was against it.

In spring 2003, the survivors of George Eric Smith, 38, and Timothy Soulas, 35, both killed in the Twin Towers on September 11, sued Baathist Iraq, al Qaeda, and the Taliban in federal court for the murders of their loved ones. James Woolsey — a Carter-administration Navy undersecretary and former Clinton-appointed director of Central Intelligence — and Laurie Mylroie, an Iraq-policy adviser to the 1992 Clinton campaign, both offered sworn testimony on Saddam Hussein's involvement in terrorist financing and training.

"I believe it is definitely more likely than not that some degree of common effort in the sense of aiding or abetting or conspiracy was involved here between Iraq and the al-Qaeda," Woolsey said under oath on March 3, 2003. Clinton's CIA chief from 1993 to 1995 added: "Even if one cannot show that...any of the individual 19 hijackers were trained at Salman Pak, the nature of the training and the circumstances suggest, to my mind, at least, some kind of common aiding, abetting, assistance, cooperation — whatever word you might want to take."

Mylroie, a former Naval War College associate professor, testified: "It took a state like Iraq to carry out an attack as really sophisticated, massive and deadly as what happened on September 11."

While Saddam Hussein did not respond to this suit, Clinton-appointed U.S. District Judge Harold Baer Jr. was persuaded by this and other evidence, including satellite photos of Salman Pak, a suspected terrorist training camp 15 miles outside Baghdad.

"I conclude that plaintiffs have shown, albeit barely, 'by evidence satisfactory to the court,' that Iraq provided material support to bin Laden and al Qaeda," Baer announced May 7, 2003, in Manhattan. He then awarded the plaintiffs $104 million in Baathist funds.

That day, CBSNews.com posted the following headline: "Court Rules: Al Qaida, Iraq Linked."

As William Kristol has noted, the summer 2004 reports of the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee and the 9/11 Commission both concluded that Hussein's regime and al Qaeda were, in fact, in communication. However, both documents deny a formal, Hussein-bin Laden treaty-type alliance.

Bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee Report (Conclusion 95, page 347): "The Central Intelligence Agency's assessment on safe haven — that al-Qaida or associated operatives were present in Baghdad and in northeastern Iraq in an area under Kurdish control — was reasonable."
The 9/11 Commission Report (page 61): "With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request." However, "the ensuing years saw additional efforts to establish connections."

The 9/11 Commission Report (page 66): "In March 1998, after Bin Ladin's public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin's Egyptian deputy, [Ayman al] Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis."


Many of these details would shock most Americans, even most news junkies. Thank the Bush administration for that. It has been, charitably, flaccid about detailing Saddam Hussein's terrorist resume. Administration officials tell me they fear doing so may invite media criticism.

That is pathetic.

If President Bush stopped campaigning and spent the next week at a soup kitchen, the media carping would commence at once: "Why now?...Why not a month ago?... The soup is too hot...The soup is too cold...Beef barley?...What about the homeless vegetarians?..."

So, President Bush might as well showcase the abundant proof of Hussein's generosity to terrorists. Critics will hiss. Supporters will cheer. And undecided voters will learn how vital it is that he dislodged the man who was global terrorism's chief benefactor.

As for John Kerry, he once again reveals himself as an opportunist who tailors his views, even on Saddam Hussein's philanthropy of terror, to fit his political ends.

* * *


http://www.nationalreview.com/murdock/murdock200410071005.asp

 

[mach8]

Sounds like the same talk we heard from Adolfs' boys, "uncle" Joe Stalin, and Comrade Mao. Seems some people are learning historys lessons. BIG LIE, Repeat OFTEN............................................

 

[fossten]

Good article, Vitas.

 

[RRocket]

I'm confused. I have read much of the 9/11 Report. There are areas that seem to hint a bit at a connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda. But ultimately, the report itself says there were no connections.

Page 334: Responding to a presidential tasking, Clarke’s office sent a memo to Rice on September 18, titled “Survey of Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks.” Rice’s chief staffer on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, concurred in its conclusion that only some anecdotal evidence linked Iraq to al Qaeda.The memo found no “compelling case” that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks. It passed along a few foreign intelligence reports, including the Czech report alleging an April 2001 Prague meeting between Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer (discussed in chapter 7) and a Polish report that personnel at the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence in Baghdad were told before September 11 to go on the streets to gauge crowd reaction to an unspecified event. Arguing that the case for links between Iraq and al Qaeda was weak, the memo pointed out that Bin Ladin resented the secularism of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Ladin on unconventional weapons."

You'll also note on Page 61 in addition to what you said it also states that Bin Laden was doing terrorist operations AGAINST Saddam. Interesting.

If you really want to learn what goes on inside Osama brain, and why/how he became the lunatic he is today, please read "The Osama bin Laden I Know : An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader" by Peter Bergen. It's fantastic and scary at the same time. It's really the definitive book about Bin Laden. If you want to "know your enemy", this is the book to read.

There is no question that Iraq at least had dialogue with Al Qaeda, but it didn't seem to amount to much in the end, at least according to the Report. Al Qaeda really didn't need Iraq to do what they wanted to do anyways. They were perfectly capable of being horrifically evil on their own. The fact that they talked wasn't enough to make a solid connection, unfortunately. If talking alone makes for a connection, I guess the US has a "connection" with the Taliban, since they spoke to them several times and even hosted them in Texas! In addition, Bush gave the Taliban $43 million dollars! Quite the gift, considering at the time the US knew Bin Laden was in Afghanistan and the US was lobbying the UN to impose sanctions on them for refusing to turn him over! And yes, this was BEFORE 9/11. That is all FACT. Look it up if you think I'm BSing. That alone is far more of a "connection" than Iraq had with Al Qaeda.

While I agree the Democrats might be denying the existence of the sand, the Republicans may have their heads buried in it......

 

[RB3]

I'm confused. I have read much of the 9/11 Report. There are areas that seem to hint a bit at a connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda. But ultimately, the report itself says there were no connections.

No, that isn't quite what it says. That's what some liberal news outlets claimed it said, which is different. No wonder you're confused. I am posting a new article, after this one, addressing the commission report.

Page 334: Responding to a presidential tasking, Clarke’s office sent a memo to Rice on September 18, titled “Survey of Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks.” Rice’s chief staffer on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, concurred in its conclusion that only some anecdotal evidence linked Iraq to al Qaeda.The memo found no “compelling case” that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks. It passed along a few foreign intelligence reports, including the Czech report alleging an April 2001 Prague meeting between Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer (discussed in chapter 7) and a Polish report that personnel at the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence in Baghdad were told before September 11 to go on the streets to gauge crowd reaction to an unspecified event. Arguing that the case for links between Iraq and al Qaeda was weak, the memo pointed out that Bin Ladin resented the secularism of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Ladin on unconventional weapons."

Clarke is a discredited source. He also claimed Condi Rice didn't know who Al-Quaeda was, an asinine statement which was easily refuted with Rice's own statments prior to Clarke's idiot pronouncement. Again, saying Saddam and bin Laden didn't like each other isn't proof they didn't cooperate against a common enemy.

You'll also note on Page 61 in addition to what you said it also states that Bin Laden was doing terrorist operations AGAINST Saddam. Interesting.

Why is this interesting? He's done terrorist operations against Muslims. He's a terrorist and a criminal.

If you really want to learn what goes on inside Osama brain, and why/how he became the lunatic he is today, please read "The Osama bin Laden I Know : An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader" by Peter Bergen. It's fantastic and scary at the same time. It's really the definitive book about Bin Laden. If you want to "know your enemy", this is the book to read.

And if you really want to know whats going on, perhaps you should try reading more than one book.

There is no question that Iraq at least had dialogue with Al Qaeda, but it didn't seem to amount to much in the end, at least according to the Report. Al Qaeda really didn't need Iraq to do what they wanted to do anyways. They were perfectly capable of being horrifically evil on their own. The fact that they talked wasn't enough to make a solid connection, unfortunately. If talking alone makes for a connection, I guess the US has a "connection" with the Taliban, since they spoke to them several times and even hosted them in Texas! In addition, Bush gave the Taliban $43 million dollars! Quite the gift, considering at the time the US knew Bin Laden was in Afghanistan and the US was lobbying the UN to impose sanctions on them for refusing to turn him over! And yes, this was BEFORE 9/11. That is all FACT. Look it up if you think I'm BSing. That alone is far more of a "connection" than Iraq had with Al Qaeda.

First you claim (in another thread) there was no connection, now your new version is "it didn't amount to much." Based, apparently, on nothing but speculation on your part. And your "FACTS" vis a vis the Taliban and Bush are once again, utterly irrelevant. So what? This proves what? In what bizzaro world does this have anything to do with Saddam and Al Qaeda cooperating?

While I agree the Democrats might be denying the existence of the sand, the Republicans may have their heads buried in it......

Well, relative to facing the reality of terrorism, Canadians have buried their entire bodies and are still digging.

 

[RB3]

More on the 9/11 report....

Iraq & al Qaeda

The 9/11 Commission raises more questions than it answers.

The 9/11 Commission's staff has come down decidedly on the side of the naysayers about operational ties between Saddam Hussein's regime and Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network. This development is already being met with unbridled joy by opponents of the Iraq war, who have been carping for days about recent statements by President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney that reaffirmed the deposed Iraqi regime's promotion of terror.

The celebration is premature. The commission's cursory treatment of so salient a national question as whether al Qaeda and Iraq confederated is puzzling. Given that the panel had three hours for Richard Clarke, one might have hoped for more than three minutes on Iraq. More to the point, though, the staff statements released Wednesday — which seemed to be contradicted by testimony at the public hearing within minutes of their publication — raise more questions than they answer, about both matters the staff chose to address and some it strangely opted to omit.
The staff's sweeping conclusion is found in its Statement No. 15 ("Overview of the Enemy"), which states:

Bin Laden also explored possible cooperation with Iraq during his time in Sudan, despite his opposition to Hussein's secular regime. Bin Laden had in fact at one time sponsored anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Sudanese, to protect their own ties with Iraq, reportedly persuaded Bin Laden to cease this support and arranged for contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda. A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan, finally meeting Bin Laden in 1994. Bin Laden is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded. There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda also occurred after Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan, but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship. Two senior Bin Laden associates have adamantly denied that any ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States.

Just taken on its own terms, this paragraph is both internally inconsistent and ambiguously worded. First, it cannot be true both that the Sudanese arranged contacts between Iraq and bin Laden and that no "ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq." If the first proposition is so, then the "[t]wo senior Bin Laden associates" who are the sources of the second are either lying or misinformed.

In light of the number of elementary things the commission staff tells us its investigation has been unable to clarify (for example, in the very next sentence after the Iraq paragraph, the staff explains that the question whether al Qaeda had any connection to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing or the 1995 plot to blow U.S. airliners out of the sky "remains a matter of substantial uncertainty"), it is fair to conclude that these two senior bin Laden associates may not be the most cooperative, reliable fellows in town regarding what bin Laden was actually up to. Moreover, we know from press reports and the administration's own statements about the many al Qaeda operatives it has captured since 9/11 that the government is talking to more than just two of bin Laden's top operatives. That begs the questions: Have we really only asked two of them about Iraq? If not, what did the other detainees say?

INCONVENIENT FACTS
The staff's back-of-the-hand summary also strangely elides mention of another significant matter — but one that did not escape the attention of Commissioner Fred Fielding, who raised it with a panel of law-enforcement witnesses right after noting the staff's conclusion that there was "no credible evidence" of cooperation. It is the little-discussed original indictment of bin Laden, obtained by the Justice Department in spring 1998 — several weeks before the embassy bombings and at a time when the government thought it would be prudent to have charges filed in the event an opportunity arose overseas to apprehend bin Laden. Paragraph 4 of that very short indictment reads:

Al Qaeda also forged alliances with the National Islamic Front in the Sudan and with the government of Iran and its associated terrorist group Hezballah for the purpose of working together against their perceived common enemies in the West, particularly the United States. In addition, al Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq.

This allegation has always been inconvenient for the "absolutely no connection between Iraq and al Qaeda" club. (Richard Clarke, a charter member, handles the problem in his book by limiting the 1998 indictment to a fleeting mention and assiduously avoiding any description of what the indictment actually says.)

It remains inconvenient. As testimony at the commission's public hearing Wednesday revealed, the allegation in the 1998 indictment stems primarily from information provided by the key accomplice witness at the embassy bombing trial, Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl. Al-Fadl told agents that when al Qaeda was headquartered in the Sudan in the early-to-mid-1990s, he understood an agreement to have been struck under which the jihadists would put aside their antipathy for Saddam and explore ways of working together with Iraq, particularly regarding weapons production.

On al Qaeda's end, al-Fadl understood the liaison for Iraq relations to be an Iraqi named Mahmdouh Mahmud Salim (a.k.a. "Abu Hajer al Iraqi"), one of bin Laden's closest friends. (There will be a bit more to say later about Salim, who, it bears mention, was convicted in New York last year for maiming a prison guard in an escape attempt while awaiting trial for bombing the embassies.) After the embassies were destroyed, the government's case, naturally, was radically altered to focus on the attacks that killed over 250 people, and the Iraq allegation was not included in the superseding indictment. But, as the hearing testimony made clear, the government has never retracted the allegation.

Neither have other important assertions been retracted, including those by CIA Director George Tenet. As journalist Stephen Hayes reiterated earlier this month, Tenet, on October 7, 2002, wrote a letter to Congress, which asserted:
"Our understanding of the relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda is evolving and is based on sources of varying reliability. Some of the information we have received comes from detainees, including some of high rank. We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda going back a decade. Credible information indicates that Iraq and Al Qaeda have discussed safe haven and reciprocal nonaggression. Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of Al Qaeda members, including some that have been in Baghdad. We have credible reporting that Al Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire W.M.D. capabilities. The reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to Al Qaeda members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs. Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians coupled with growing indications of relationship with Al Qaeda suggest that Baghdad's links to terrorists will increase, even absent U.S. military action."

Tenet, as Hayes elaborated, has never backed away from these assessments, reaffirming them in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee as recently as March 9, 2004.

Is the commission staff saying that the CIA director has provided faulty information to Congress? That doesn't appear to be what it is saying at all. This is clear — if anything in this regard can be said to be "clear" — from the staff's murky but carefully phrased summation sentence, which is worth parsing since it is already being gleefully misreported: "We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States." That is, the staff is not saying al Qaeda and Iraq did not cooperate — far from it. The staff seems to be saying: "they appear to have cooperated but we do not have sufficient evidence to conclude that they worked in tandem on a specific terrorist attack, such as 9/11, the U.S.S. Cole bombing, or the embassy bombings."

KABUL...BAGHDAD...
The same might, of course, be said about the deposed Taliban government in Afghanistan. Before anyone gets unhinged, I am not suggesting that bin Laden's ties to Iraq were as extensive as his connections to Afghanistan. But as is the case with Iraq, no one has yet tied the Taliban to a direct attack on the United States, although no one doubts for a moment that deposing the Taliban post-9/11 was absolutely the right thing to do.

I would point out, moreover, that al Qaeda is a full-time terrorist organization — it does not have the same pretensions as, say, Sinn Fein or Hamas, to be a part-time political party. Al Qaeda's time is fully devoted to conducting terrorist attacks and planning terrorist attacks. Thus, if a country cooperates with al Qaeda, it is cooperating in (or facilitating, abetting, promoting — you choose the euphemism) terrorism. What difference should it make that no one can find an actual bomb that was once in Saddam's closet and ended up at the Cole's hull? If al Qaeda and Iraq were cooperating, they had to be cooperating on terrorism, and as al Qaeda made no secret that it existed for the narrow purpose of inflicting terrorism on the United States, exactly what should we suppose Saddam was hoping to achieve by cooperating with bin Laden?

Of course, we may yet find that Saddam was a participant in the specific 9/11 plot. In that regard, the commission staff's report is perplexing, and, again, raises — or flat omits — many more questions than it resolves.

DON'T FORGET SHAKIR
For one thing, the staff has now addressed the crucial January 2000 Malaysia planning session in a few of its statements. As I have previously recounted, this was the three-day meeting at which Khalid al Midhar and Nawaf al Hazmi, eventual hijackers of Flight 77 (the one that hit the Pentagon), met with other key 9/11 planners. The staff's latest report, Statement Number 16 ("Outline of the 9/11 Plot"), even takes time to describe how the conspirators were hosted in Kuala Lampur by members of a Qaeda-affiliated terror group, Jemaah Islamiah. But the staff does not mention, let alone explain, let alone explain away, that al Midhar was escorted to the meeting by Ahmed Hikmat Shakir.

Shakir is the Iraqi who got his job as an airport greeter through the Iraqi embassy, which controlled his work schedule. He is the man who left that job right after the Malaysia meeting; who was found in Qatar six days after 9/11 with contact information for al Qaeda heavyweights — including bin Laden's aforementioned friend, Salim — and who was later detained in Jordan but released only after special pleading from Saddam's regime, and only after intelligence agents concluded that he seemed to have sophisticated counter-interrogation training. Shakir is also the Iraqi who now appears, based on records seized since the regime's fall, to have been all along an officer in Saddam's Fedayeen.

Does all this amount to proof of participation in the 9/11 plot? Well, in any prosecutor's office it would be a pretty good start. And if the commission staff was going to get into this area of Iraqi connections to al Qaeda at all, what conceivable good reason is there for avoiding any discussion whatsoever of Shakir? At least tell us why he is not worth mentioning.

PRAGUE PROBLEM
One thing the staff evidently thought it was laying to rest was the other niggling matter of whether 9/11 major domo Mohammed Atta met with Iraqi intelligence officer Ahmed al-Ani in Prague in April 2001. The staff's conclusion is that the meeting is a fiction. To say its reasoning is less than satisfying would be a gross understatement. Here's the pertinent conclusion, also found in Statement Number 16:
We have examined the allegation that Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague on April 9 [2001]. Based on the evidence available — including investigation by Czech and U.S. authorities plus detainee reporting — we do not believe that such a meeting occurred. The FBI's investigation places him in Virginia as of April 4, as evidenced by this bank surveillance camera shot of Atta withdrawing $8,000 from his account. Atta was back in Florida by April 11, if not before. Indeed, investigation has established that, on April 6, 9, 10, and 11, Atta's cellular telephone was used numerous times to call Florida phone numbers from cell sites within Florida. We have seen no evidence that Atta ventured overseas again or re-entered the United States before July, when he traveled to Spain under his true name and back under his true name.

This is ground, again, that I've recently covered. To rehearse: Czech intelligence has alleged that Atta was seen in Prague on April 8 or 9, 2001. Atta had withdrawn $8,000 cash from a bank in Virginia on April 4 and was not eyeballed again by a witness until one week later, on April 11. The new detail added by the staff is that Atta's cell phone was used in Florida on three days (April 6, 9 and 10) during that time frame. Does this tend to show he was in Florida rather than Prague? It could, but not very convincingly. Telling us Atta's cell phone was used is not the same as telling us Atta used the cell phone.

Atta almost certainly would not have been able to use the cell phone overseas, so it would have been foolish to tote it along to the Czech Republic — especially if he was traveling clandestinely (as the large cash withdrawal suggests). He would have left it behind. Atta, moreover, had a roommate (and fellow hijacker), Marwan al-Shehhi. It is certainly possible that Shehhi — whom the staff places in Florida during April 2001 — could have used Atta's cell phone during that time.

Is it possible that Atta was in Florida rather than Prague? Of course it is. But the known evidence militates strongly against that conclusion: an eyewitness puts Atta in Prague, meeting with al-Ani; we know Atta was a "Hamburg student" and represented himself as such in a visa application; it has been reported that the Czechs have al-Ani's appointment calendar and it says he was scheduled to meet on the critical day with a "Hamburg student"; and we know for certain that Atta was in Prague under very suspicious circumstances twice in a matter of days (May 30 and June 2, 2000) during a time the Czechs and Western intelligence services feared that Saddam, through al-Ani, might be reviving a plot to use Islamic extremists to bomb Radio Free Europe (a plot the State Department acknowledged in its annual global terror report notwithstanding that the commission staff apparently did not think the incident merited mention).

I am perfectly prepared to accept the staff's conclusion about Atta not being in Prague — if the commission provides a convincing, thoughtful explanation, which is going to have to get a whole lot better than a cell-phone record.

What is the staff's reason for rejecting the eyewitness identification? Is the "Hamburg student" entry bogus? Since the staff is purporting to provide a comprehensive explanation of the 9/11 plot — the origins of which it traces back to 1999 — what is their explanation for what Atta was doing in Prague in 2000? Why, when the staff went into minute detail about the travels of other hijackers (even when it conceded it did not know the relevance of those trips), was Atta's trip to Prague not worthy of even a passing mention? Why was it so important for Atta to be in Prague on May 30, 2000 that he couldn't delay for one day, until May 31, when his visa would have been ready? Why was it so important for him to be in Prague on May 30 that he opted to go despite the fact that, without a visa, he could not leave the airport terminal? How did he happen to find the spot in the terminal where surveillance cameras would not capture him for nearly six hours? Why did he go back again on June 2? Was he meeting with al-Ani? If so, why would it be important for him to see al-Ani right before entering the United States in June 2000? And jumping ahead to 2001, if Atta wasn't using cash to travel anonymously, what did he do with the $8000 he suddenly withdrew before disappearing on April 4? If his cell phone was used in Florida between April 4 and April 11, what follow-up investigation has been done about that by the 9/11 Commission? By the FBI? By anybody? Whom was the cell phone used to call? Do any of those people remember speaking to Atta at that time? Perhaps someone would remember speaking with the ringleader of the most infamous attack in the history of the United States if he had called to chat, no?

Are these questions important to answer? You be the judge. According to the 9/11 Commission staff report, bin Laden originally pressed the operational supervisor of the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM), "that the attacks occur as early as mid-2000," even though bin Laden "recognized that Atta and the other pilots had only just arrived in the United States to begin their flight training[.]" Well I'll be darned: mid-2000 is exactly when Atta made his two frenetic trips to Prague immediately before heading to the United States to begin that flight training.

The commission staff next says, "n 2001, Bin Laden apparently pressured KSM twice more for an earlier date. According to KSM, Bin Laden first requested a date of May 12, 2001," and then proposed a date in June or July. Well, what do you know: all those dates are only weeks after Atta may have had some reason to drop everything and secretly run to Prague for a meeting with al-Ani.

Or maybe it's just a coincidence.

— Andrew C. McCarthy, a former chief assistant U.S. attorney who led the 1995 terrorism prosecution against Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and eleven others, is an NRO contributor.* * *

 

[Vitas]

I'm confused. I have read much of the 9/11 Report. There are areas that seem to hint a bit at a connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda. But ultimately, the report itself says there were no connections.

Third public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Statement of Laurie Mylroie to the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

July 9, 2003

STATE SPONSORSHIP: WHO ARE THE TERRORIST MASTERMINDS?

The reasons why we went to war with Iraq--as an integral part of the war on terrorism--are not as well-understood as they might be. Indeed, a major misunderstanding regarding terrorism exists.

Prior to the February 26, 1993, bombing of the World Trade Center, it was assumed that major terrorist attacks against the U.S. were state-sponsored. But that bombing is said to mark the start of a new kind of terrorism that does not involve states.

That notion is dubious. Rather, the claim that a new, stateless terrorism emerged with the 1993 Trade Center bombing was a convenient explanation in that it required no military response. Once promulgated, it was hastily accepted--even before much progress had been made in the investigation of that attack itself.

There isn't time to properly address that issue in this testimony. Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein's Unfinished War against America contains the fullest account of this author's argument that there is no new source of major terrorist attacks on the U.S. They were state-sponsored--and remain so. That that is not understood is the result of a major intelligence and policy failure that occurred in the 1990s.

<snip>

9/11: A Family of Masterminds or Terrorists with Legends?

Following the 9/11 attacks, there was much speculation about Iraq's possible role. I won't address those points, although some information, like the claim of two Iraqi defectors that Iraqi intelligence trained non-Iraqi Arab militants to hijack airplanes at Salman Pak deserves more attention than it has received. That is particularly so, because when U.S. Marines took Salman Pak, they captured such individuals and learned from the interrogations that they were training as terrorists.

I want to focus on the terrorist masterminds. U.S. authorities have learned much more about al Qaeda since the 9/11 strikes, than they knew before them.

That includes the key role played by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. As one U.S. intelligence official explained after Mohammed's capture (March 1, 2003), "It wasn't until recently that any of us even realized he was part of al Qaeda. . . . The big problem nailing him down is that the informants we relied on, especially before 9/11, were mujaheddin. They'd been in Afghanistan, in Sudan, back in Afghanistan. Khalid was never a part of any of that." (emphasis added).

In addition, two of Ramzi Yousef's older brothers--Abdul Karim and Abdul Monim-have been identified as al Qaeda masterminds, capable of assuming Mohammed's role. Also, an individual, Ali Abdul Aziz, who played an important role in the financial transfers involved in the 9/11 attacks, is said to be Yousef's "younger cousin."

Thus, according to U.S. officials, at the core of the terrible series of attacks against the U.S., starting with the 1993 Trade Center bombing and culminating in the 9/11 assaults, is an unusually talented and murderous family: Yousef, his uncle, his two brothers, his cousin, and his childhood friend.

This is without precedent; no terrorist organization has at its core a family. Also, all these masterminds are Baluch. And with the possible exception of the cousin, all are supposed to have been born and raised in Kuwait--and their identities are based on documents in Kuwait that predate Kuwait's liberation.

The Baluch and Iraq

The Baluch are a Sunni Muslim people, with their own language, who live on both sides of the Iranian-Pakistani border. Like the Kurds, the Baluch aspired to a state of their own, but failed to achieve it. Most Americans know nothing about the Baluch, because the U.S. has virtually nothing to do with them.

No Baluch organization is on the State Department list of terrorist states. Prior to the 1993 Trade Center bombing, no Baluch was ever involved in a terrorist attack on the U.S.

The Baluch have no evident motive for engagement in these monstrous assaults against the U.S.-save for one notable point: their ties with Iraqi intelligence.

The Iranian Baluch have long been at odds with the Shi'a government in Tehran. Those tensions were much exacerbated by Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979.

Iraqi intelligence has deep and well-established ties with the Baluch on both sides of the Iran-Pakistan border and used them against Iran. So explained Gen. Wafiq Samarrai, who headed Iraqi Military Intelligence until 1991, before he later defected. Iraqi Military Intelligence ran the Baluch as spies during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) out of the Gulf shaykhdom of Dubai, according to Samarrai.

That is a critical point. The only apparent motive of these Baluch individuals for involve-ment in assaulting the U.S. would appear to be the ties that the Baluch have with Iraqi intelligence. That is particularly so as Yousef, Murad, and Mohammed do not really appear to be Islamic militants, judging from their behavior in the Philippines.

Let us consider two hypotheses to explain the identities of these terrorist masterminds. The official U.S. explanation is that they are a murderous family.

There is another explanation: these individuals are elements of Iraq's long-standing Baluch network. And while Iraq occupied Kuwait, Iraqi intelligence used documents in Kuwait to create legends for these illegals.

I recently asked a colleague, retired from the position of #2 in Israeli Military Intelligence, which explanation made more sense: a murderous family vs. illegals with legends. He replied, "It's obvious."

Indeed, Jim Hoagland has suggested the same. Hoagland asked, "How did al Qaeda, within two or three years, go from obscurity to becoming super-terrorists capable of blowing up U.S. embassies, warships, and skyscrapers with astonishing precision?" He raised the question asked here: how did a group of Baluch who grew up in Kuwait acquire such remarkable skills as terrorist masterminds, and why would they devote their lives to killing Americans? He then hinted at an answer. "Could al Qaeda have been the target of a takeover operation by an intelligence service with good legend-manufacturing skills and a great, burning desire for revenge on the United States?"

That is what happened, I think. After al Qaeda moved to Afghanistan, Iraqi intelligence became deeply involved with it, probably, with the full agreement of Usama bin Ladin. Al Qaeda provided the ideology, foot soldiers, and a cover for the terrorist attacks; Iraqi intelligence provided the direction, training, and expertise in the form of figures like Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.

Both sides benefited: bin Ladin was able to carry out major attacks for which al Qaeda had previously lacked the skill and training; Iraq escaped detection and punishment, because every attack was blamed on al Qaeda alone.

This hypothesis is easy to test. How to pursue Ramzi Yousef's identity has already been explained in terms of Karim's teachers. In addition, certain documents should be obtain-ed pertaining to Yousef, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and the other Baluch terrorists.

As for Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, US records also exist, as there really was an individual, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, born and raised in Kuwait. After graduating high school, Mohammed attended college in the U.S. The key question-- whether the terrorist known as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is the same person as the student--can be pursued, in a manner similar to the pursuit of Yousef's identity. If the terrorist is not the student, then Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is--like Abdul Basit Karim--a legend for a terrorist, whose real identity we do not know. And the only party that, reasonably, could have created that legend is Iraq, while it occupied Kuwait.

Conclusion

A major misunderstanding regarding the nature of terrorism arose in the wake of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, with the claim that a new form of terrorism had emerged that was no longer state-sponsored.

On the contrary, the major terrorist strikes against the U.S. that were attributed to "loose networks" of Islamic militants, including al Qaeda, are much better explained as Iraq, working with and hiding behind the militants. In short, the 1991 Gulf War did not end with the cease-fire declared back then.

The failure to pursue the question of the identities of the terrorist masterminds is a major lapse in the investigation. Most likely, if that issue were pursued it would provide a definitive tie between Iraqi intelligence and the 9/11 strikes, as well as other major attacks.

It is unlikely that these Baluch masterminds are a family; it is far more likely that they are Iraqi "illegals," given "legends" on the basis of Kuwaiti documents, while Iraq occupied Kuwait.

The principle reason this issue has not been pursued is strong bureaucratic obstructionism in the US and UK, by individuals who cannot (or will not) recognize they have made a major mistake. Almost certainly, neither President Bush nor Prime Minister Blair understands how easy it may be to demonstrate Iraq's link to the 9/11 attacks and other acts of terrorism. It may require intervention from such a senior level to overcome the bureaucratic obstructionism.


http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing3/witness_mylroie.htm

 

[Vitas]

Going once...

 

[JohnnyBz00LS]

Third public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Statement of Laurie Mylroie to the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

July 9, 2003

STATE SPONSORSHIP: WHO ARE THE TERRORIST MASTERMINDS?

<snip>

Conclusion

A major misunderstanding regarding the nature of terrorism arose in the wake of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, with the claim that a new form of terrorism had emerged that was no longer state-sponsored.

On the contrary, the major terrorist strikes against the U.S. that were attributed to "loose networks" of Islamic militants, including al Qaeda, are much better explained as Iraq, working with and hiding behind the militants. In short, the 1991 Gulf War did not end with the cease-fire declared back then.

The failure to pursue the question of the identities of the terrorist masterminds is a major lapse in the investigation. Most likely, if that issue were pursued it would provide a definitive tie between Iraqi intelligence and the 9/11 strikes, as well as other major attacks.

It is unlikely that these Baluch masterminds are a family; it is far more likely that they are Iraqi "illegals," given "legends" on the basis of Kuwaiti documents, while Iraq occupied Kuwait.

The principle reason this issue has not been pursued is strong bureaucratic obstructionism in the US and UK, by individuals who cannot (or will not) recognize they have made a major mistake. Almost certainly, neither President Bush nor Prime Minister Blair understands how easy it may be to demonstrate Iraq's link to the 9/11 attacks and other acts of terrorism. It may require intervention from such a senior level to overcome the bureaucratic obstructionism.

A whole lot of "what ifs" and "unlikelys" strung together in a purely speculative opinionated article that doesn't prove a connection between Saddam and 9/11. If taken into perspective, the Florida flight schools where the 9/11 hijackers learned to fly could rightly be considered a larger supporter of the 9/11 attacks than Saddam Hussein. How comforting it is to know that training activities for the 9/11 attack took place under the nose of GW's little brother Jeb. Could he also be considered a terrorist sponsor?

Keep kicking up the sand, Vitas. Pretty soon you'll be burried up to your neck.

 

[Vitas]

A whole lot of "what ifs" and "unlikelys" strung together in a purely speculative opinionated article .....

It is not an “article” it is testimony presented at the hearings.

It is common sense logic that builds a case based on circumstantial evidence


circumstantial evidence
n. evidence in a trial which is not directly from an eyewitness or participant and requires some reasoning to prove a fact. There is a public perception that such evidence is weak ("all they have is circumstantial evidence"), but the probable conclusion from the circumstances may be so strong that there can be little doubt as to a vital fact ("beyond a reasonable doubt" in a criminal case, and "a preponderance of the evidence" in a civil case). Particularly in criminal cases, "eyewitness" ("I saw Frankie shoot Johnny") type evidence is often lacking and may be unreliable, so circumstantial evidence becomes essential.

http://dictionary.law.com/default2.asp?typed=circumstantial&type=1&submit1.x=72&submit1.y=13

Criminals cover their tracks, Johnny. We could not for years prosecute the mafia, because they covered their tracks well. It does not mean that they did not exist, and it does not mean that they did not murder people.

Kerry discussed "terrorist organizations" at an August 1, 1996, Senate Intelligence Committee hearing. He said, "These entities survive with country support, the support of the country of Syria, or country of Libya, or country of Iran, Iraq, and so forth."

"Saddam Hussein has already used these weapons [of mass death] and has made it clear that he has the intent to continue to try, by virtue of his duplicity and secrecy, to continue to do so," Kerry told reporters on February 23, 1998. "That is a threat to the stability of the Middle East. It is a threat with respect to the potential of terrorist activities on a global basis."

"The important thing is that Saddam Hussein and the world knows that we think Saddam Hussein is essentially out of synch with the times." Kerry said December 11, 2001 On Fox News's O'Reilly Factor. "He is and has acted like a terrorist, and he has engaged in activities that are unacceptable."

Kerry continued: "The hammer, ultimately, will be the evidence that we uncover as we go further down the trail that shows his support for terrorism and begins to build the coalition even more strongly."

"I think we clearly have to keep the pressure on terrorism globally. This doesn't end with Afghanistan by any imagination," he said December 14, 2001 on CNN. "Terrorism is a global menace. It's a scourge. And it is absolutely vital that we continue, for instance, Saddam Hussein."

Just before authorizing the Iraq war on October 9, 2002, Kerry referred to Saddam Hussein on the Senate floor: "He has supported and harbored terrorist groups, particularly radical Palestinian groups such as Abu Nidal, and he has given money to families of suicide murderers in Israel."


If the new John Kerry finds the old John Kerry's words unpersuasive, the former should consult Stephen Hayes's indispensable best seller, The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America, a guided tour of the terrorism factory that was Baathist Iraq. Among overwhelming evidence of Saddam Hussein's terrorist activities, Kerry will find numerous statements by liberal journalists, leading Democrats, and even a Clinton-appointed federal judge tying Saddam Hussein to Islamist terror.

President Clinton addressed the nation on June 24, 1993. He said: "[T]here is compelling evidence that there was, in fact, a plot to assassinate former President Bush; and that this plot, which included the use of a powerful bomb made in Iraq, was directed and pursued by the Iraqi Intelligence Service."

The late Les Aspin, Clinton's first Defense secretary, said of this plot: "The evidence is very conclusive that it was the work of the Iraqi Intelligence Service and is an action that would have had to have been approved by the highest levels of the Iraqi government."

Then-U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Madeleine Albright, showed the Security Council photos of the captured bombs. She said, "Certain aspects of these devices have been found only in devices linked to Iraq and not in devices used by any other terrorist groups."

In the spring of 1998, Clinton's Justice Department indicted Osama bin Laden for al Qaeda's attacks on U.S. interests. As the indictment read, "Al Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq."

As bin Laden's relationship with the Taliban showed some strains, the Washington Post published an Associated Press story on Valentine's Day 1999. It concluded: "The Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has offered asylum to bin Laden, who openly supports Iraq against Western powers."


In April 2000, President Clinton's State Department issued the 1999 edition of "Patterns of Global Terrorism," a biennial overview. As it had since 1993, Team Clinton's inaugural year, State designated Iraq a state sponsor of terrorism. "Iraq continued to plan and sponsor international terrorism in 1999," the report concluded. Baghdad "continued to provide safe haven and support to various terrorist groups."

On June 2, 2002, CBS's 60 Minutes aired Lesley Stahl's interview with Abdul Rahman Yasin, the al Qaeda murderer who the Justice Department indicted for preparing the bomb that exploded beneath One World Trade Center in February 1993.

"The majority of the people who work in the World Trade Center are Jews," Yasin said, explaining why he and his comrades targeted the WTC. Stahl interviewed Yasin in Baghdad where he fled after the blast, which killed six individuals and wounded 1,042. Before presenting him to Stahl, Iraqi authorities claimed they jailed Yasin for the bombing.

However, according to Sheila MacVicar of ABC's defunct Day One program, Yasin was a free man. "Last week, Day One confirmed he [Yasin] is in Baghdad," MacVicar reported June 27, 1994. "Just a few days ago, he was seen at [his father's] house by ABC News. Neighbors told us Yasin comes and goes frequently." Iraqi intelligence documents discovered since Baghdad's liberation indicate that Yasin received government-funded housing and a monthly salary.

Importantly, papers like these, and the post-liberation arrests of terrorists in Iraq — such as the now-deceased Palestinian extremist Abu Abbas — have implicated Saddam Hussein even further since his defeat.

New York Democrat Hillary Rodham Clinton declared on the Senate floor October 10, 2002, that Saddam Hussein gave "aid, comfort and sanctuary to terrorists, including al-Qaeda members."

That same day, North Carolina Democrat John Edwards — who crowed in Tuesday's vice-presidential debate that Hussein's ties to al Qaeda were "tenuous, at best" — told the Senate, "Almost no one disagrees with these basic facts: that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a menace; that he has weapons of mass destruction and that he is doing everything in his power to get nuclear weapons; that he has supported terrorists..."

The next day, Clinton and Edwards voted to authorize the Iraq war, as did John Kerry, back when he was for it, before he was against it.

"I believe it is definitely more likely than not that some degree of common effort in the sense of aiding or abetting or conspiracy was involved here between Iraq and the al-Qaeda," Woolsey said under oath on March 3, 2003. Clinton's CIA chief from 1993 to 1995 added: "Even if one cannot show that...any of the individual 19 hijackers were trained at Salman Pak, the nature of the training and the circumstances suggest, to my mind, at least, some kind of common aiding, abetting, assistance, cooperation — whatever word you might want to take."

Mylroie, a former Naval War College associate professor, testified: "It took a state like Iraq to carry out an attack as really sophisticated, massive and deadly as what happened on September 11."

While Saddam Hussein did not respond to this suit, Clinton-appointed U.S. District Judge Harold Baer Jr. was persuaded by this and other evidence, including satellite photos of Salman Pak, a suspected terrorist training camp 15 miles outside Baghdad.

"I conclude that plaintiffs have shown, albeit barely, 'by evidence satisfactory to the court,' that Iraq provided material support to bin Laden and al Qaeda," Baer announced May 7, 2003, in Manhattan. He then awarded the plaintiffs $104 million in Baathist funds.

That day, CBSNews.com posted the following headline: "Court Rules: Al Qaida, Iraq Linked."


As William Kristol has noted, the summer 2004 reports of the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee and the 9/11 Commission both concluded that Hussein's regime and al Qaeda were, in fact, in communication. However, both documents deny a formal, Hussein-bin Laden treaty-type alliance.

Bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee Report (Conclusion 95, page 347): "The Central Intelligence Agency's assessment on safe haven — that al-Qaida or associated operatives were present in Baghdad and in northeastern Iraq in an area under Kurdish control — was reasonable."
The 9/11 Commission Report (page 61): "With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request." However, "the ensuing years saw additional efforts to establish connections."

The 9/11 Commission Report (page 66): "In March 1998, after Bin Ladin's public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin's Egyptian deputy, [Ayman al] Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis."


Saddam Hussein lost the Gulf War, and then the terrorist attacks began. According to you, we should ignore circumstantial evidence.


We all owe the victims of the 9/11 attack, and our Country, at least minimum due diligence.

 

[Vitas]

If taken into perspective, the Florida flight schools where the 9/11 hijackers learned to fly could rightly be considered a larger supporter of the 9/11 attacks than Saddam Hussein. How comforting it is to know that training activities for the 9/11 attack took place under the nose of GW's little brother Jeb. Could he also be considered a terrorist sponsor?

Keep kicking up the sand, Vitas. Pretty soon you'll be burried up to your neck.

That statement is so beyond absurd that you really need to consult with a professional.