fossten
Dedicated LVC Member
There is no evidence that this is happening here.
Left andRight, meet in the middle.
- Thread starter TheDude
- Start date
Not yet - we just gave corporations free rein to buy advertising for campaigns. The gate has been opened and the animals are running free... Just wait until the elections this fall... and watch the results roll in the next congressional session.
fossten
Dedicated LVC Member
How convenient. You're firing a pre-emptive excuse to shield your Socialist-in-chief from prime criticism when his heavily unpopular policies and thug tactics result in the loss of the House and maybe even the Senate.
I don't know what will happen with the elections - remember, the Dems will be harvesting that unlimited corporate money as well. And in the last election Dems were massacring the Reps in the money race.
fossten
Dedicated LVC Member
Well at least you've covered your bases. If the Republicans win, it was the eeeeeeeeeevil corporatocracy that bought the election.
Even assuming your (still) unjustified premise, that is a MASSIVE logical leap.
Unless you can logically justify that premise your "argument" is nothing but hollow speculation and hyperbole.
Ignoring the need to justify that premise doesn't make it go away.
You are asserting two incompatible things. If all humans have rights regardless of wealth, that would include the owners of corporations, the employees of corporations, etc. Weather they act on those rights individually or collectively is irrelevant. You have agreed before that institutions are ultimately representative of the individuals who make them up. Why are corporations different? Because you resent them?
It is just speculation shag - based on the past. Look at what GM did in the 90s. You claim that the dems owe their soul to the unions because of the money given to the party by their groups, what will be different when corporations give massive amounts to the advertising campaigns of politicians? What makes the corporations money different than the union money?
Corporations are not ultimately representative of the individuals that make them up. The shareholders of any business do not all think the same, vote the same, belong to the same political group.
Shag, do you think that corporations have natural rights? Would have Locke or Jefferson made that leap?
fossten
Dedicated LVC Member
Then why did you call it a 'fact?'
Not much in my view, so let them all contribute. I don't remember you EVER whining about the unions' contributions. So STFU, hypocrite.
TheDude
Dedicated LVC Member
I can't grasp how anyone can justify this. An embryo up to a certain point has no rights, but a bodiless Corporate entity now does?
TheDude
Dedicated LVC Member
While the story does seem like a spin-attempt with the wording, imo, it's obtuse to say "it's only the advertisement."
I agree with you on the Unions bit, but another wrong added to the pile won't make things better.
fossten
Dedicated LVC Member
When the Democrats start pushing to remove union and 501(c)(3) influence, then I'll listen. Until then, it's just the Democrats bitching because the rules aren't leaning all the way on their side anymore.
Correction; based on cherry picked and misrepresented examples from the past.
Your conclusion doesn't follow from the premise. In this case, it isn't even a logical leap; it is misdirection.
Again, misrepresentation. The individuals who make up a corporation all have natural rights.
Also, what you are asserting here is completely inconsistent with what you are have agreed with in the past on this forum and you know it.
In short, you are making excuses and cheap rationalizations to defend your ill conceived notions; you are in full propaganda mode.
This blog explains the rationale behind this better then I can. Basically, no one is asserting that corporations have rights, but that the individuals involved with the corporation have rights. Treating a corporation as an individual in court is a means of protecting the rights of the individuals who make up the corporation.
The links in the blog are also good sources for further edification on this issue (though reading the ruling might take some time
)People Organized as Corporations are People Too
by Ilya Somin
Others, such as senior Conspirator Eugene Volokh, are much better qualified than I am to comment on today’s important free speech decision striking down restrictions on campaign-related speech by corporations. I want to focus on the common claim that corporations aren’t entitled to free speech rights (and perhaps other constitutional rights) because they aren’t “real people.” That argument was reiterated in Justice John Paul Stevens’ dissenting opinion today:
There are various other arguments for treating political speech by people organized as corporations differently from that by people using other organizational forms. I’m not going to try to address them all here. We can discuss them more productively if we first dispense with the weak but popular claim that corporations aren’t entitled to freedom of speech because they aren’t people.
UPDATE: I should mention that it’s irrelevant that the First Amendment specifically protects the freedom of “the press.” It does not specifically mention “press” entities organized as corporations. So if you believe that freedom of speech doesn’t apply to corporations because they “aren’t people,” the same point applies to freedom of the press. As co-blogger Eugene explains, “freedom of the press” is not a constitutional right for a particular group of people or organizations. Rather it is a right to engage in a certain class of activities (such as publishing newspapers and pamphlets), whether the person doing so is a professional member of the media or not.
by Ilya Somin
Others, such as senior Conspirator Eugene Volokh, are much better qualified than I am to comment on today’s important free speech decision striking down restrictions on campaign-related speech by corporations. I want to focus on the common claim that corporations aren’t entitled to free speech rights (and perhaps other constitutional rights) because they aren’t “real people.” That argument was reiterated in Justice John Paul Stevens’ dissenting opinion today:
Stevens hammers, more than once this morning from the bench on the principle that corporations “are not human beings” and “corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.” He insists that “they are not themselves members of ‘We the People’ by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.”
It’s true, of course, that corporations “are not human beings.” But their owners (the stockholders) and employees are. Human beings organized as corporations shouldn’t have fewer constitutional rights than those organized as sole proprietors, partnerships, and so on. In this context, it’s important to emphasize that most media organizations and political activist groups also use the corporate form. As Eugene points out, most liberals accept the idea that organizational form is irrelevant when it comes to media corporations, which were exempt from the restrictions on other corporate speech struck down by the Court today. The Supreme Court (including its most liberal justices) has repeatedly recognized that media corporations have First Amendment rights just as broad as those extended to media owned by individuals. Yet the “corporations aren’t people” argument applies just as readily to media corporations as to others. After all, newspapers, radio stations, and TV stations “are not human beings” and they too “have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.” We readily reject this reasoning in the case of media corporations because we recognize that even though the corporations in question are not people, their owners and employees are. The same point applies to other corporations. There are various other arguments for treating political speech by people organized as corporations differently from that by people using other organizational forms. I’m not going to try to address them all here. We can discuss them more productively if we first dispense with the weak but popular claim that corporations aren’t entitled to freedom of speech because they aren’t people.
UPDATE: I should mention that it’s irrelevant that the First Amendment specifically protects the freedom of “the press.” It does not specifically mention “press” entities organized as corporations. So if you believe that freedom of speech doesn’t apply to corporations because they “aren’t people,” the same point applies to freedom of the press. As co-blogger Eugene explains, “freedom of the press” is not a constitutional right for a particular group of people or organizations. Rather it is a right to engage in a certain class of activities (such as publishing newspapers and pamphlets), whether the person doing so is a professional member of the media or not.
Here is another blog by the same guy that adds some more to this issue.
Corporate Rights and Property Rights are Human Rights: Why it’s a Mistake to Conflate a Right with the Means Used to Exercise it
by Ilya Somin
In my last post, I explained why it’s a mistake to deny free speech rights to people organized as corporations on the grounds that corporations aren’t “real people.” It’s true, of course, that a corporation is not a person. But the people who own and operate it are. “Corporate speech” is really just speech by people using the corporate form.
The mistake here is one we see in other contexts. Critics often denigrate rights by conflating them with the means used to exercise them. For example, a standard rhetorical attack on property rights is the claim that property rights aren’t really “human rights.” Property has no rights, it is said. Its true of course that property as such is not entitled to any rights. However, property rights actually belong to the people who own the property, not the physical objects themselves. As the Supreme Court explained in its 1972 decision in Lynch v. Household Financial Corporation:
This rhetorical tactic is most often used by liberals and leftists to criticize rights advocated by conservatives and libertarians. However, it’s important to understand that the same ploy can easily be turned on rights favored by the political left. Consider, for instance, the right to use contraceptives upheld by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut. Contraceptives, after all, have no rights. They are inanimate physical objects, like any other property. Under the Connecticut law banning their use, women were still free to avoid pregnancy (e.g. — by abstaining from sex, or by using the rhythm method). They just couldn’t use this particular type of property to do it. It’s easy to see that any such critique of Griswold would be specious. After all, contraceptives are just a means that women use to exercise their rights to reproductive choice, albeit a particularly effective one.
The same point applies to corporate speech and property rights. When corporations “speak,” they are just a means that individuals use to exercise their rights of free speech — often a more effective means than the available alternatives. And just as the right protected in Griswold actually was a human right rather than a right belonging to the contraceptives, property rights are rights of human owners, not rights belonging to tracts of land or objects.
Abjuring this common rhetorical tactic doesn’t by itself resolve longstanding debates over the scope and content of human rights. You can still attack property rights or corporate free speech rights on other grounds. But it does help focus the discussion on real issues and reduce rhetorical distractions.
by Ilya Somin
In my last post, I explained why it’s a mistake to deny free speech rights to people organized as corporations on the grounds that corporations aren’t “real people.” It’s true, of course, that a corporation is not a person. But the people who own and operate it are. “Corporate speech” is really just speech by people using the corporate form.
The mistake here is one we see in other contexts. Critics often denigrate rights by conflating them with the means used to exercise them. For example, a standard rhetorical attack on property rights is the claim that property rights aren’t really “human rights.” Property has no rights, it is said. Its true of course that property as such is not entitled to any rights. However, property rights actually belong to the people who own the property, not the physical objects themselves. As the Supreme Court explained in its 1972 decision in Lynch v. Household Financial Corporation:
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a “personal” right.... In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property.
When I criticize decisions like Kelo v. City of New London, the objection is not that government has violated the rights of land or buildings, but those of the people who own them. This rhetorical tactic is most often used by liberals and leftists to criticize rights advocated by conservatives and libertarians. However, it’s important to understand that the same ploy can easily be turned on rights favored by the political left. Consider, for instance, the right to use contraceptives upheld by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut. Contraceptives, after all, have no rights. They are inanimate physical objects, like any other property. Under the Connecticut law banning their use, women were still free to avoid pregnancy (e.g. — by abstaining from sex, or by using the rhythm method). They just couldn’t use this particular type of property to do it. It’s easy to see that any such critique of Griswold would be specious. After all, contraceptives are just a means that women use to exercise their rights to reproductive choice, albeit a particularly effective one.
The same point applies to corporate speech and property rights. When corporations “speak,” they are just a means that individuals use to exercise their rights of free speech — often a more effective means than the available alternatives. And just as the right protected in Griswold actually was a human right rather than a right belonging to the contraceptives, property rights are rights of human owners, not rights belonging to tracts of land or objects.
Abjuring this common rhetorical tactic doesn’t by itself resolve longstanding debates over the scope and content of human rights. You can still attack property rights or corporate free speech rights on other grounds. But it does help focus the discussion on real issues and reduce rhetorical distractions.
TheDude
Dedicated LVC Member
If this change only went to the Right-side of the aisle, okay, t!t-for-tat. But the Left is open to it as well.
Here is the best explanation yet from that blog...
Lessened Corporate First Amendment Rights and Media Corporations
by Eugene Volokh
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Citizens United argues that corporations should have sharply reduced First Amendment rights, at least when it comes to speech about political candidates. The obvious response, which the majority makes at length, is that this would leave the government free to impose similar restraints on newspapers, magazines, broadcasters, and others, since nearly all of them are organized as corporations as well. (Congress has so far exempted most media corporations from these restrictions; but the argument that corporations have reduced First Amendment rights would suggest that these exemptions are just a matter of legislative grace, and that Congress could restrict media corporations if it wanted.)
Not so, argues the dissent (echoing the views of many commentators who support restrictions on corporate speech). “The press plays a unique role not only in the text, history, and structure of the First Amendment but also in facilitating public discourse” (p. 85). “The text and history [of the First Amendment] highlighted by our colleagues suggests why one type of corporation, those that are part of the press, might be able to claim special First Amendment status, and therefore why some kinds of ‘identity’-based distinctions might be permissible after all.” (P. 40 n.57.) More broadly, I’ve heard commentators argue, media corporations have nothing to fear from court decisions that treat the First Amendment as less protective of the rights of corporations, since media corporations have special protection under the Free Press Clause.
Yet why would that be so? If the Free Speech Clause doesn’t cover corporations (or doesn’t cover them as strongly), why should the Free Press Clause be read as strongly protecting corporations? Say the dissent is right that “there is not a scintilla of evidence to support the notion that anyone believed [the First Amendment] would preclude regulatory distinctions based on the corporate form” (pp. 34–35), and that this is relevant today (something I’m skeptical about, since there’s also no evidence to the contrary, and since the lack of any evidence may suggest that modern business corporations weren’t much contemplated by the Framers). This would simply suggest that the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment would allow restrictions on media corporations just as the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment would allow restrictions on other corporations.
Nor is it enough to say that “the press” gets special protection under the First Amendment. The question still remains who qualifies as “the press” for full constitutional protection. If the argument is that the speech of corporations doesn’t fully qualify as part of “the freedom of speech,” because it comes from corporations, why should the use of the press by corporations fully qualify as part of “the freedom ... of the press”?
But beyond this, Justice Stevens simply seems to assume that “the press” refers to an industry — consider Justice Stevens’ reference to “one type of corporation, those that are part of the press” — rather than a technology. Why should we believe that this is so?
After all, the presses in the Framing era were used not just by professional newspaper publishers. They were used by book authors, by pamphleteers, and by leafleters, for whom public commentary was a sideline to their normal lines of business. They were used by politicians who wrote articles for newspapers. I know of no evidence that the “liberty of the press” was seen as excluding those speakers, and covering only professional newspapermen.
And I know of some evidence to the contrary.
David Hume’s Of the Liberty of the Press (1742), for instance, discussed “the liberty of the press, by which all the learning, wit, and genius of the nation may be employed on the side of freedom and everyone be animated to its defense.” Did he really mean to limit this to the liberty of professional newspaper publishers, and to exclude book authors and others who contributed much “learning, wit, and genius” without being professional publishers? I doubt it, and later he speaks of “book or pamphlet” as being covered.
Likewise, the Continental Congress’s Letter to the Inhabitants of Quebec discusses “[t]he importance” of “the freedom of the press” as “consists[ing] besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.” Advancement of science, morality, and the arts, I assume, was not seen as the domain of the professional press; at the time, this was generally done through books, many of which were published by people (for instance, scientists) who were not “part of the press” as an industry. It seems quite unlikely that “the freedom of the press” was seen by the Continental Congress as limited to the industry labeled as “the press.” The statement is more consistent with seeing the freedom of the press as the freedom of all to use the technology of the press.
Even Blackstone’s position on the freedom of the press, while in many ways quite restrictive, speaks of it as the right of “Every freeman”: Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press.” This fits poorly with the position that the right belongs only to the institutional press.
Early American cases on the freedom of the press are few, but two cases from the 1820s and the 1830s reinforce this. Consider the very first American court decision holding a government action to be an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of the press, Brandreth v. Lance (N.Y. Chanc. Ct. 1839). Lance was a business rival of Brandreth’s, who apparently commissioned one Trust to write an allegedly libelous biography of Brandreth, and then had Hodges (a printer) publish it. Brandreth got an injunction against Lance, Trust, and Hodges; the New York Chancery Court held that the injunction violated the liberty of the press. But nothing in the court’s opinion suggested that the liberty of the press was a right that belonged only to printer Hodges — the injunction was dissolved as to all the defendants.
Likewise, Commonwealth v. Blanding (Mass. 1825), involved a criminal libel prosecution of Blanding, who was not a newspaper publisher; Blanding “delivered the writing set forth in the indictment to the printer of the Providence Gazette, ... and ... it was published in that paper at the request of [Blanding].” (The case doesn’t reveal whether Blanding paid for the placement.) The court rejected Blanding’s freedom of the press argument, but only because it concluded that libels weren’t covered by the freedom of the press, and because the freedom of the press was only a freedom from prior restraint. “The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible in case of its abuse; like the right to keep fire arms, which does not protect him who uses them for annoyance or destruction.” There was no suggestion that the liberty of the press consisted only of the liberty of people “who are part of the press” in the sense of an industry.
None of these cases, of course, involved corporations. But they do show that “liberty of the press” was seen as a right to publish to the world at large using the technology of the “press” (including by using others’ presses, whether for pay or because they liked what you wrote), not as a right that belonged to members a particular industry. The institutional media and other people are on par for purposes of “the freedom of speech, or of the press.” The constitutional protections offered to the institutional media are no greater than those offered to others. And thus if ordinary business corporations lack First Amendment rights, so do those business corporations that we call media corporations.
by Eugene Volokh
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Citizens United argues that corporations should have sharply reduced First Amendment rights, at least when it comes to speech about political candidates. The obvious response, which the majority makes at length, is that this would leave the government free to impose similar restraints on newspapers, magazines, broadcasters, and others, since nearly all of them are organized as corporations as well. (Congress has so far exempted most media corporations from these restrictions; but the argument that corporations have reduced First Amendment rights would suggest that these exemptions are just a matter of legislative grace, and that Congress could restrict media corporations if it wanted.)
Not so, argues the dissent (echoing the views of many commentators who support restrictions on corporate speech). “The press plays a unique role not only in the text, history, and structure of the First Amendment but also in facilitating public discourse” (p. 85). “The text and history [of the First Amendment] highlighted by our colleagues suggests why one type of corporation, those that are part of the press, might be able to claim special First Amendment status, and therefore why some kinds of ‘identity’-based distinctions might be permissible after all.” (P. 40 n.57.) More broadly, I’ve heard commentators argue, media corporations have nothing to fear from court decisions that treat the First Amendment as less protective of the rights of corporations, since media corporations have special protection under the Free Press Clause.
Yet why would that be so? If the Free Speech Clause doesn’t cover corporations (or doesn’t cover them as strongly), why should the Free Press Clause be read as strongly protecting corporations? Say the dissent is right that “there is not a scintilla of evidence to support the notion that anyone believed [the First Amendment] would preclude regulatory distinctions based on the corporate form” (pp. 34–35), and that this is relevant today (something I’m skeptical about, since there’s also no evidence to the contrary, and since the lack of any evidence may suggest that modern business corporations weren’t much contemplated by the Framers). This would simply suggest that the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment would allow restrictions on media corporations just as the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment would allow restrictions on other corporations.
Nor is it enough to say that “the press” gets special protection under the First Amendment. The question still remains who qualifies as “the press” for full constitutional protection. If the argument is that the speech of corporations doesn’t fully qualify as part of “the freedom of speech,” because it comes from corporations, why should the use of the press by corporations fully qualify as part of “the freedom ... of the press”?
But beyond this, Justice Stevens simply seems to assume that “the press” refers to an industry — consider Justice Stevens’ reference to “one type of corporation, those that are part of the press” — rather than a technology. Why should we believe that this is so?
After all, the presses in the Framing era were used not just by professional newspaper publishers. They were used by book authors, by pamphleteers, and by leafleters, for whom public commentary was a sideline to their normal lines of business. They were used by politicians who wrote articles for newspapers. I know of no evidence that the “liberty of the press” was seen as excluding those speakers, and covering only professional newspapermen.
And I know of some evidence to the contrary.
David Hume’s Of the Liberty of the Press (1742), for instance, discussed “the liberty of the press, by which all the learning, wit, and genius of the nation may be employed on the side of freedom and everyone be animated to its defense.” Did he really mean to limit this to the liberty of professional newspaper publishers, and to exclude book authors and others who contributed much “learning, wit, and genius” without being professional publishers? I doubt it, and later he speaks of “book
Likewise, the Continental Congress’s Letter to the Inhabitants of Quebec discusses “[t]he importance” of “the freedom of the press” as “consists[ing] besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.” Advancement of science, morality, and the arts, I assume, was not seen as the domain of the professional press; at the time, this was generally done through books, many of which were published by people (for instance, scientists) who were not “part of the press” as an industry. It seems quite unlikely that “the freedom of the press” was seen by the Continental Congress as limited to the industry labeled as “the press.” The statement is more consistent with seeing the freedom of the press as the freedom of all to use the technology of the press.
Even Blackstone’s position on the freedom of the press, while in many ways quite restrictive, speaks of it as the right of “Every freeman”: Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press.” This fits poorly with the position that the right belongs only to the institutional press.
Early American cases on the freedom of the press are few, but two cases from the 1820s and the 1830s reinforce this. Consider the very first American court decision holding a government action to be an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of the press, Brandreth v. Lance (N.Y. Chanc. Ct. 1839). Lance was a business rival of Brandreth’s, who apparently commissioned one Trust to write an allegedly libelous biography of Brandreth, and then had Hodges (a printer) publish it. Brandreth got an injunction against Lance, Trust, and Hodges; the New York Chancery Court held that the injunction violated the liberty of the press. But nothing in the court’s opinion suggested that the liberty of the press was a right that belonged only to printer Hodges — the injunction was dissolved as to all the defendants.
Likewise, Commonwealth v. Blanding (Mass. 1825), involved a criminal libel prosecution of Blanding, who was not a newspaper publisher; Blanding “delivered the writing set forth in the indictment to the printer of the Providence Gazette, ... and ... it was published in that paper at the request of [Blanding].” (The case doesn’t reveal whether Blanding paid for the placement.) The court rejected Blanding’s freedom of the press argument, but only because it concluded that libels weren’t covered by the freedom of the press, and because the freedom of the press was only a freedom from prior restraint. “The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible in case of its abuse; like the right to keep fire arms, which does not protect him who uses them for annoyance or destruction.” There was no suggestion that the liberty of the press consisted only of the liberty of people “who are part of the press” in the sense of an industry.
None of these cases, of course, involved corporations. But they do show that “liberty of the press” was seen as a right to publish to the world at large using the technology of the “press” (including by using others’ presses, whether for pay or because they liked what you wrote), not as a right that belonged to members a particular industry. The institutional media and other people are on par for purposes of “the freedom of speech, or of the press.” The constitutional protections offered to the institutional media are no greater than those offered to others. And thus if ordinary business corporations lack First Amendment rights, so do those business corporations that we call media corporations.
TheDude
Dedicated LVC Member
I don't entirely agree with that, those on the board of any certain corporation already do have their own rights.
While on the other-hand, the 'corporation as an individual' can allow the board members exempt from wrong doings, even though they're the ones in control of the corporation, e.g. a company willfully cuts corners on any certain good to lower their overhead, all the while making it dangerous. I think those on the board that approved and knowingly did so, should be held personally accountable for any injuries or deaths their product caused, not the bodiless entity.
This ruling doesn't add rights in any way. Limiting a corporation in this area would also infringe upon the rights of the owners of the corporation.
And those people are not?
The board members are just as subject to the law in any circumstance as anyone else. However, how much responsibility do the board members bear in your hypothetical? They are not the ones making the decisions to "cut corners" and make their product more dangerous. That would be the decision of various employees; specifically in the area of management.
So, in the event that their product harms someone through no fault of their own (a very important distinction) how much (if any) responsibility lies with the board and how much with those who actually made the decision to cut costs in such a way?
If you just generally assign responsibility to the corporation as a whole you are going to end up punishing innocent people and creating more injustice then justice in the punishment. Justice demands that you take the time to find out what individuals broke any law, determine their degree of responsibility and punish them accordingly. Anything else is unjust.
Shag - as Dude alluded - if you allow corporations the same rights as individuals - because they are made up of individuals, then they bear the same responsibilities as individuals, and the whole would be subject to law, the same law as individuals.
Wrongful death cases against corporations will be tried in criminal court, and the punishments will be dealt with accordingly. Jail time, death sentence - it is what the individual has to face, therefore, it should be what the corporation has to face. Since they are on the same 'level' when it comes to rights - they should be on the same level when it comes to law.
You have given the corporation unalienable rights.
You have negated
So, since they now have rights - do you allow them the right to vote? Where do you draw the line shag?
Voting is a right - why just stop at the first amendment...
Corporatocracy is in your future....
Corporations, however, have resources far beyond those available to real persons, and giving corporations the right to contribute to issue advertising campaigns, for example, ensures the corporate point of view will be able to overwhelm citizen perspectives. Corporations also benefit from a host of characteristics - limited liability, perpetual life, inability to be imprisoned-that advantage them over people in economic and political contests and that immunize them from many of society's sanctions.
And now - for the really fun part -
Who will Citgo be giving money to? (obama right - Hugo and he are big buddies... /s)
Who will Sony be giving money to?
How about Hyundai, Stahlgruber, BP, Tata, Sinopec, AlRosa, Aramco?
You know, there isn't any citizenship qualifier here...
And since you are going with the whole - people make up corporations, so they should be afforded rights...
My state government is made up of people... So, my state government should be allowed to spend money to get a candidate elected that it likes. Currently my state government is democrat. So, I think by the same logic, my state government should be able to spend money advertising how wonderful it would be to reelect Senator Bennet.
Wrongful death cases against corporations will be tried in criminal court, and the punishments will be dealt with accordingly. Jail time, death sentence - it is what the individual has to face, therefore, it should be what the corporation has to face. Since they are on the same 'level' when it comes to rights - they should be on the same level when it comes to law.
You have given the corporation unalienable rights.
You have negated
"We the People of the United States".
"That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."
"That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."
So, since they now have rights - do you allow them the right to vote? Where do you draw the line shag?
Voting is a right - why just stop at the first amendment...
Corporatocracy is in your future....
Corporations, however, have resources far beyond those available to real persons, and giving corporations the right to contribute to issue advertising campaigns, for example, ensures the corporate point of view will be able to overwhelm citizen perspectives. Corporations also benefit from a host of characteristics - limited liability, perpetual life, inability to be imprisoned-that advantage them over people in economic and political contests and that immunize them from many of society's sanctions.
And now - for the really fun part -
Who will Citgo be giving money to? (obama right - Hugo and he are big buddies... /s)
Who will Sony be giving money to?
How about Hyundai, Stahlgruber, BP, Tata, Sinopec, AlRosa, Aramco?
You know, there isn't any citizenship qualifier here...
And since you are going with the whole - people make up corporations, so they should be afforded rights...
My state government is made up of people... So, my state government should be allowed to spend money to get a candidate elected that it likes. Currently my state government is democrat. So, I think by the same logic, my state government should be able to spend money advertising how wonderful it would be to reelect Senator Bennet.
Last edited by a moderator:
Union PACs are voluntary - like all PACs they are made of individual contributions. The people in the organization decide, on an individual basis, if they want to contribute or not. There are lots of PACs - not just unions.
However, here the people within the corporation have no say. They can't say that they don't want their percentage of money not to go to a candidate.
If Coors decides to back Palin for President and gives her campaign hours of advertising time, but 1/2 of the people in the company don't want her for president, they can't 'opt out'. The board decides on how they want the money spent, reducing the money in the coffers, and in this case, reducing profit sharing (Coors has a liberal profit sharing plan). So, 1/2 or maybe more people within Coors will be unwillingly donating 'their' money to a campaign for someone they don't like.
The PAC states who/what they will be backing, and then the individual gets to decide if they want to add their money to the fund. In a corporation, the individual isn't allowed that opportunity.
This isn't about the individual - this is about the board...
So, foss, the health care company you work for could decide to sink all of its profits so that Obama gets reelected. That includes the money that would have gone to your profit sharing plan, which perhaps you were in line to get $10,000 this year. So, you have just given $10,000 to reelect Obama...
thanks Foss!!!!
fossten
Dedicated LVC Member
Yeah. That'll never happen. Obama will make sure that no health care company has any profits left to donate.
Thanks fox!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (moron)
Again, that is not what is being done. Corporations are simply a means to exercise a right.
It is rude to muddy the waters by injecting false premises
fossten
Dedicated LVC Member
Oh, lets unmuddy then...
But Foss, Obama has promised that your company won't be part of an industry wide lawsuit brought on by the DOJ, if only they give 2 million to his campaigns advertising. So they did...
However, Obama is defeated, because your company's competition gave Nadar 3 million dollars. Your company goes bankrupt because of the ensuing lawsuit, you are out of a job, still out that $10,000, and the green party is now in power...
My 'what if' is far better than yours.
And for both you and shag - how about having those international companies having a big say in our government? Citgo has a lot of money Foss... ING even more. And I am sure both would love to have American politicians beholding to them.
This is not about first amendment rights because a company is made of individuals - as I have pointed out that is ridiculous, and then can be extrapolated to allow state/local governments similar opportunities.
This is bad precedent...
Apples and oranges.
Corporations are protected under the first amendment because of the fact that they are private property that can be used as a means to exercise a right. That isn't a factor in government institutions. You really should go back and read those blogs I posted. They spell all this out.
I should mention that it’s irrelevant that the First Amendment specifically protects the freedom of “the press.” It does not specifically mention “press” entities organized as corporations. So if you believe that freedom of speech doesn’t apply to corporations because they “aren’t people,” the same point applies to freedom of the press. As co-blogger Eugene explains, “freedom of the press” is not a constitutional right for a particular group of people or organizations. Rather it is a right to engage in a certain class of activities (such as publishing newspapers and pamphlets), whether the person doing so is a professional member of the media or not.
...When corporations “speak,” they are just a means that individuals use to exercise their rights of free speech — often a more effective means than the available alternatives...
...When corporations “speak,” they are just a means that individuals use to exercise their rights of free speech — often a more effective means than the available alternatives...
fossten
Dedicated LVC Member
Not really. Never mind your wild, silly, logical leap...has Obama kept one single promise yet? You keep forgetting about the lack of character the Usurper in Chief has a problem with, race baiter.
Oh, and I don't vote my job. I'm not shallow like you.
Funny how George Soros' influence hasn't bothered you yet...